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ABSTRACT 
One of the main issues in the OS security is providing trusted code execution in an untrusted environment. 
During executing, kernel-mode drivers dynamically allocate memory to store and process their data: 
Windows core kernel structures, users’ private information, and sensitive data of third-party drivers. All this 
data can be tampered with by kernel-mode malware. Attacks on Windows-based computers can cause not 
just hiding a malware driver, process privilege escalation, and stealing private data but also failures of 
industrial CNC machines. Windows built-in security and existing approaches do not provide the integrity 
and confidentiality of the allocated memory of third-party drivers. The proposed hypervisor-based system 
(AllMemPro) protects allocated data from being modified or stolen. AllMemPro prevents access to even 1 
byte of allocated data, adapts for newly allocated memory in real time, and protects the driver without its 
source code. AllMemPro works well on newest Windows 10 1709 x64.  
Keywords: hypervisor-based protection, Windows kernel, Intel, CNC security, rootkits, dynamic data 
protection. 
 
1. INTRODUCTION  
Currently, protection of data in computer memory 
is becoming essential. Growing integration of 
ubiquitous Windows-based computers into 
industrial automation makes this security issue 
critically important. Windows machines can be 
attacked when malware kernel-mode code 
manipulates the memory content of legal drivers 
and their dynamically allocated memory pools, 
which store critical data.  
Intruders can tamper with this data by installing 
their own malware driver or using vulnerabilities of 
the installed kernel mode modules (Adler, 2017).  
There are a number of vulnerabilities in Windows 
kernel core drivers as well as in the third-party 
drivers such as NVIDIA Windows GPU Display 
Driver (NVIDIA Corporation, 2017), Audio Driver 
(Gee, 2017), keyboard driver (CSO, 2017), 
Schneider Electric UnitelWay Device Driver 
(Langill, 2011). For example, an attacker could 
successfully exploit the CVE-2017-0155 
vulnerability in the Win32k component and run 
arbitrary code in kernel mode (Microsoft, 2017). 
 
The vulnerable VirtualBox driver (VBoxDrv.sys) 
has been exploited by Turla rootkit and allows to 
write arbitrary values to any kernel memory (Singh, 
2015; Kirda, 2015).  
Another vulnerability of CPU-Z driver has been 
exploited in HandleMaster project change granted 
access rights for handles (MarkHC, 2017). 
Additionally, in a recent paper ‘Windows 
exploitation in 2016’ researchers from ESET 
underline the vulnerability of third-party drivers as 
a real vector of exploitation (Baranov, 2016). 
This malicious code is running at the same 
privilege level as a Windows kernel. There are no 
built-in Windows security control features to 
prevent illegal malware access in the kernel mode.  
As a result, intruders can tamper with the following 
allocated data in the kernel-mode, see Figure 1: 
 Windows core kernel; 
 User data; 
 Industrial automation control software. 
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Figure 1 Examples of driver’s memory access attempts to the allocated memory:  
legitimate access attempts are in green, unauthorized ones are dashed red arrows 
 
Windows kernel security issues. Firstly, hackers 
patch allocated system data in Windows kernel to 
prevent the detection of installed malware drivers 
and escalate process privileges. Information about a 
loaded driver is collected in several system lists, 
which include allocated structures connected by 
linked lists. Hackers can unlink the structure of 
malware driver from all these lists to make them 
hidden. Consequently, bytes in these structures in 
memory can be deliberately changed and made 
useless in finding malware footprints. These rootkit 
techniques are known as DKOM. Also, rootkits can 
read the undocumented kernel-mode values. For 
example, DisPG disables Windows Kernel Patch 
Protection by using the undocumented value 
nt!PoolBigPageTableSize, which needs to be 
protected (Korkin & Tanda, 2017).  
Usually, malware processes are running with low 
privilege and obtaining high privilege can allow the 
malware to perform more operations. Process 
privileges can be escalated by exploiting kernel 
mode driver bugs using SID List Patching, 
Privileges Patching, and Token Stealing payloads 
(Perla & Oldani, 2010; Hasherezade, 2017). The 
issue of finding and exploiting kernel-mode 
vulnerabilities is quite challenging and powerful 
because it could allow compromising the system 
completely (Cisco, 2017).  
Another example of escalating process privileges is 
the mimikatz framework, which loads its own 
driver and manipulates Token value from 
EPROCESS structure (Delpy, 2018).  
The ProjectSauron is one of the examples of 
kernel-mode malware drivers, which are classified 
as Advanced Persistent Threat. It supports 
commands to elevate privileges to a system account 
(Kaspersky, 2016).  
One more example is the CVE-2016-7255 exploit, 
which uses type-confusion vulnerability in 
win32k.sys (CVE-2016-7255) to gain elevated 
privileges by patching EPROCESS structure (Oh & 
Florio, 2017). The similar Elevation-of-Privilege 
(EOP) attack was used in Duqu 2.0 exploit (Wook 
& Florio, 2015).  
Another exploit overwrites the Server Message 
Block (SMB) connection session structures to gain 
Admin/SYSTEM session (Rapid7, 2018).  
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Apart from EPROCESS structures attackers are 
also patching other allocated Windows objects.  
TDL bootkit conceals its presence in the system by 
modifying the StartIo field of the target device’s 
driver and excluding the target device from the 
DRIVER_OBJECT’s linked list (Rodionov & 
Matrosov, 2011).   
Win32/Gapz and ProxyBox hook IRP handlers 
from DRIVER_OBJECT.MajorFunction[] array to 
protect itself from being removed from the system. 
(Rodionov & Matrosov, 2013; Bingham, 2012).  
Another technique is to manipulate IRP structure 
and IO_STACK_LOCATION. For example, by 
changing CompletionRoutine pointer it is possible 
to avoid the calling of completion routine of a filter 
driver, which prevents collecting evidence of 
suspicious activity (Blunden, 2009).  
Windows 10 supports Supervisor Mode Execution 
Prevention (SMEP), which prevents the kernel 
from executing code in user mode, a common 
technique used for local kernel elevation of 
privilege (EOP). SMEP requires processor support 
found in Intel Ivy Bridge or later processors, and it 
also can be bypassed (Shahat, 2018).  
The protection system needs to provide integrity for 
the sensitive memory objects, linked lists as well as 
preventing modification of each data structure in 
these lists, which has been dynamically allocated 
by Windows kernel. Additionally, the security 
software needs to prevent illegal reading of critical 
Windows kernel values.  
User data issues. Secondly, malware can attack the 
user data located in the kernel memory. For 
example, malware could steal or overwrite private 
keys, which are used in cryptographic drivers and 
can be used to decrypt user data. Malware can also 
attack a user’s privacy by reading Windows 
telemetry and other data collected by Windows OS.  
The protection system needs to prevent 
unauthorized access to memory data dynamically 
allocated by third-party drivers. 
Security of industrial automation control 
software. Thirdly, malware can cause considerable 
damage by attacking industrial control software. 
Stuxnet is a famous example of kernel-mode 
malware, which took out 1000 centrifuges at Iran's 
nuclear facility. Its driver deliberately attacked 
Windows-based Industrial Control Systems (ICS), 
which is used with Siemens PLC (Anderson et al., 
2017).  
A similar vector for cyber-attacks is the software 
for the machines with computer numerical control 
(CNC), which use computers to handle various 
machine tools: lathes, grinders, drilling machines 
etc. CNC machines are extremely popular in the 
cutting-edge manufacturing, for example, they are 
used by NASA, Boeing, SpaceX etc. (Isakovic, 
2018).  
Cybersecurity researchers emphasize a substantial 
risk of cyber-attacks against manufacturing systems 
and CNC machines (Vincent et al., 2015; Chhetri et 
al., 2016). Researchers illustrate various threatening 
scenarios related to remote maintenance of CNC 
machines (Mehnen et al., 2017). Security experts 
from the USA stress the serious security risks for 
CNC machines and provide nine basic protection 
tasks to do before connecting machine tools to the 
network. One is to “install a Windows anti-virus 
protection service” (Johnson, 2017). However, 
there are no specific AV services to protect 
industrial CNC machines; and it is obvious that 
basic desktop AVs cannot provide full protection 
for CNC machines.  
The recent report from a German IT association 
says that more than a half of companies in 
Germany “have been victims of industrial 
espionage, sabotage or data theft in the last two 
years” and these “companies had incurred a loss of 
around 55 billion euros per year”, which is around 
64 billion USD (Burgess, 2017).  
Another report released by Trend Micro Threat 
Research and Polytechnic University of Milan 
demonstrates the cyber-attack implementations on 
actual industrial robots. (Maggi et al., 2017) 
There are several Windows-based CNC control 
systems such as Fanuc (Fanuc, 2017), MACH 
series (Mach, 2018), UCCNC (CNCdrive, 2018), 
MicroSystems (WinCNC, 2018), which use 
kernel-mode drivers and dynamically allocate data 
in kernel mode to send the control codes to the 
machines. For example, UCCNC software provides 
an opportunity to control professional CNC 
machines using a tablet PC running on Windows 
8.1. (Stoney CNC, 2015; Bozso777, 2015). Another 
example is Fanuc software, which leverages a 
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WinIO library and a parallel port to manage CNC 
machines (DSP, 2011).  
All this industry control software can be potentially 
attacked by a malware driver, which can 
accomplish both types of attacks: sabotage and 
industrial espionage. The first type of attacks can 
result in crashing the machine or “workpiece 
damage such as spalling or delamination” (Schulze 
et al., 2011). The second type of attacks can result 
in sensitive information being stolen to reconstruct 
the workpiece or the technologies of processing, 
such as know-how, trade secrets, and confidential 
information.  
The Deutsche Welle reports that one of the CNC 
machines in a German engineering firm was 
attacked by spyware: “it turns out their computer 
controlled molding cutter came spiked with 
sophisticated malware that automatically 
transferred sensitive data about the new prototype 
to Asian-based Internet Protocol Addresses” 
(Knigge, 2013). The CNC machines security is a 
sensitive topic and existing hush-hush culture 
makes it very difficult to come up with concrete 
examples of the incidents of cyber-attacks.  
The protection software needs to prevent 
illegitimate access to dynamically allocated buffers 
in kernel-mode used by industry software drivers to 
control CNC machines.  
Threat model. Summing up all malware actions, I 
would like to introduce a threat model. The 
following malware activities will be considered in 
this paper, see Figure 1:  
 Intruders avoid all prevention measures and 
can install kernel-mode malware;  
 Malware driver easily finds the memory 
content with sensitive data and code;  
 Malware driver reads and writes the 
memory data allocated by Windows kernel 
and any third-party drivers; 
 Malware reads and writes code sections of 
kernel modules. 
The Windows operating system includes several 
features to prevent illegal memory access. 
However, these features provide only the integrity 
of code sections of kernel modules and check the 
integrity of systems linked lists. They do not 
provide the integrity of each structure from these 
lists and do not prevent reading of any kernel 
memory. 
There are several research projects, which partially 
solve the problem with protection of allocated data 
in the kernel.  
In the paper Kernel Data Integrity Protection via 
Memory Access Control by Srivastava et al., 2009 
the authors proposed using a hypervisor to mediate 
the execution of instructions attempting to write 
protected kernel data. Their system prevents 
overwriting only Windows OS critical data: process 
credentials for privilege escalation and detects 
illegal removing structures from linked lists. This 
system does not prevent confidentiality breach of 
kernel data and code nor does it track allocation of 
memory pools to protect them. 
In the paper HACS: A Hypervisor-Based Access 
Control Strategy to Protect Security-Critical 
Kernel Data by Wang et al., (2017) the authors 
focus on rootkits that place a malicious code in 
their installation procedure. HACS maintains a 
module whitelist: only the modules in the whitelist 
are legal to modify the protected region. 
Consequently, HACS does not have an opportunity 
to provide various memory access policies for 
various kernel modules. Given this opportunity, 
HACS could prevent illegal memory access if one 
of the trusted drivers is compromised.  
Another system DADE (Yi et al., 2017) provides 
kernel integrity via periodically scanning invariant 
properties and checking backtraces of kernel 
function calls. The invariants describe the behavior 
expected from an uncompromised kernel using the 
source code of OS kernel. Authors admit that 
DADE has only a probabilistic chance to detect 
integrity attacks. Neither does DADE protect the 
memory of third-party drivers. 
As a result, the issue of providing the integrity and 
confidentiality of dynamically allocated data in the 
kernel mode is unsolved. At the same time, the 
illegal memory access to this data can result in not 
only hiding malware drivers and stealing users’ 
private data, but also in damaging industrial process 
and stealing know-how.  
The goal of this paper is to tackle this issue. First, I 
propose an memory access rules to deal with 
kernel-mode malware, which have the following 
main principles:  
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 Trap each memory access and grant full 
access only to the memory data, which has 
been allocated by this driver before;  
 Prevent unauthorized access even to one 
byte of memory allocated by another 
driver;  
 Provide integrity and/or confidentiality of 
the allocated data according to the principle 
of least privilege;  
 Recover memory content after it was 
modified.  
These memory access rules have to be adapted in 
real time to changing situations in the OS and help 
to restore the original data:  
 Separate memory access rules for each 
kernel-mode driver; 
 Automatically update a list of memory 
access rules when a new driver is loaded or 
any module calls allocation or deallocation 
routines. 
The purpose of this paper is to present the design, 
implementation, and evaluation of a new 
hypervisor-based system that protects the 
dynamically allocated data in Windows kernel from 
being accessed without authorization.  
The remainder of the paper proceeds is as follows: 
Section 2 provides the review of newest kernel 
mode memory protection features, which have been 
integrated into Windows 10 1709. The comparative 
analysis of the existing memory protection 
approaches will be given according to the proposed 
threat model.  
Section 3 contains the architecture of proposed 
allocated memory protection system – AllMemPro 
and the experimental results.  
Section 4 focuses on the main conclusions and 
further research directions.  
2. BACKGROUND  
This chapter presents the analysis of the existing 
papers and software tools that are focused on 
allocated memory protection in OS kernel. Popular 
research projects are compared by their capability 
to provide integrity and confidentiality to 
dynamically allocated memory and code in 
kernel-mode for OS core kernel and third-party 
drivers.  
There are several new protection facilities which 
have been integrated on Windows 10 1709 and 
have significantly improved the security of the OS: 
Device Guard, Credential Guard, UEFI Secure 
Boot, updated Kernel Patch Protection 
(PatchGuard), Supervisor Mode Execution 
Prevention (SMEP), Early Launch Antimalware 
(ELAM), Windows Defender Exploit Guard 
(WDEG) etc. Device Guard and PatchGuard are 
dealing with the issues of memory protection in 
kernel-mode memory (Zylva, 2016; Hall et al., 
2017). 
Device Guard includes three basic components, one 
of them being the Kernel Mode Code Integrity 
(KMCI) which prevents patching executable pages 
in the kernel memory. According to the “Driver 
compatibility with Device Guard in Windows 10” 
memory pages and sections can never be writable 
and executable simultaneously and executable code 
cannot be directly modified (Baxter, 2017).  
PatchGuard protects critical structures in the 
Windows kernel from modification by unknown 
code. It stores and periodically verifies checksums 
of specific kernel memory areas. PatchGuard 
causes a BSOD if a mismatch is found. “Kernel 
patching can result in unpredictable behavior, 
system instability, and performance problems like 
the Blue Screen of Death” (Field, 2006). For linked 
lists, PatchGuard checks only the integrity of the 
links between structures and has 4 various types of 
BSOD (Marshall, 2017), without preventing the 
structure modification. In addition, PatchGuard 
reveals the corruption of MajorFunction table in 
DRIVER_OBJECT, but whether it protects other 
fields or not is undocumented (Mei, 2014; OSR, 
2016).  
In summary, Windows built-in security features 
provide the integrity of the following: 
 code sections of kernel-mode modules; 
 undocumented internal lists with allocated 
structures.  
Windows security features do not support the 
integrity and confidentiality of allocated memory of 
third-party drivers. In addition, Windows 
PatchGuard does not prevent illegal memory 
modifications; it just causes a BSOD in case of 
them. These BSODs are not appropriate for use in 
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critical infrastructure, like CNC-machines and 
industry.  
Security experts investigate these security issues 
and propose various solutions to protect sensitive 
data in the kernel mode. All projects can be divided 
into two groups that are based on kernel-mode 
drivers and hardware virtualization. The scope of 
this paper is the hypervisor-based solutions because 
they work in a more privileged mode than 
kernel-mode malware and are resilient to its 
attacks.  
All hypervisor-based approaches can be divided 
into two subgroups according to the technologies 
which they use to intercept memory access in the 
kernel-mode (Korkin & Tanda, 2017).  
The first subgroup controls memory access to the 
sensitive data by marking a memory page with this 
data as non-present. Next, each access to this page 
generates a page-fault exception (#PF), which will 
be trapped and dispatched by the hypervisor.  
The second subgroup leverages a new Intel VT-x 
with Extended Page Tables (EPT) technology. EPT 
mechanism can separately intercept read-, write-, 
and execute access. The hypervisor allows or 
disallows access to the memory page by setting bits 
in the EPT memory structures. Thus, any 
disallowed access will involve EPT violation and 
will be processed by the hypervisor.  
EPT mechanism is faster than #PF-based one. 
EPT-based approach can intercept, for example, 
only write- access and skip others, while #PF-based 
one always intercepts all access to the memory 
page. At the same time, #PF-based approaches are 
working on all computers, while EPT has been 
integrated into the Intel CPUs since Nehalem 
microarchitecture. 
Srivastava et al., (2009) confirm that “kernel-level 
malicious software has full access to the data and 
operations of all kernel components.” Their 
protection system is based on page-fault exceptions 
and protects kernel variable and system data 
structure elements from being patched by malware. 
Their system Sentry provides only integrity of 
dynamically allocated data by partitioning kernel 
memory into two parts: protected and unprotected 
regions. The authors assume that the core kernel 
has full trust, while other drivers hold only limited 
trust. Sentry mediates the execution of instructions 
attempting to write protected kernel data and 
verifies memory access at the granularity of high-
level language variables in the kernel’s source 
code. Sentry has been developed using Linux and 
Xen hypervisor. 
Thus, Sentry does not provide the following: 
 flexible memory access policy to protected 
new allocated data by third-party drivers; 
 confidentiality of data; 
 kernel-mode code integrity. 
Additionally, Sentry requires the kernel’s source 
code, which is not applicable for Windows OS. 
Another system, HACS (Hypervisor-Based Access 
Control Strategy) by Wang et al., (2017), leverages 
EPT technology to intercept write requests to the 
protected regions. HACS can detect modifications 
of security-critical kernel data and escalation 
process privileges by setting read-only access rights 
to the corresponding memory pages. Authors 
proposed to use a whitelist-based access control 
strategy. The whitelist, which is made by user 
experience, contains only credible kernel modules. 
One of HACS’s features is detecting memory 
modifications from a malware code located in the 
initialization procedures. This system is 
implemented on BitVisor version 1.4 and tested on 
Ubuntu version 14. This project includes the same 
disadvantages as the previous one and HACS 
provides just two levels of trust: legitimate or 
illegitimate modules. As a result, this system 
cannot prevent access from a legitimate module to 
the memory area, allocated by another legitimate 
one.  
The project DADE (Data Anomaly Detection 
Engine) by Yi et al., (2017) performs memory 
introspection and verifies the integrity of kernel 
data by checking whether certain integrity 
specifications hold or not. Authors propose to use 
EPT facilities to intercept write access. DADE 
marks memory pages with protected data as read-
only, and then any write access to this page 
generates a page fault, which is handled by the 
hypervisor. The key idea of DADE design is to 
leverage the information available at object 
allocation events, namely backtraces of kernel 
function calls. For example, a malware module 
attempts to remove their structure from a system 
list and produces a specific deallocation event 
The 13th Annual ADFSL Conference on Digital Forensics, Security and Law, 2018 
 7   
 
backtrace. DADE compares this backtrace with a 
legitimate one, which is produced by core kernel 
when a module is unloaded. It is obvious that these 
backtraces are different and DADE reveals the 
unlinking attack. The DADE prototype has been 
implemented using KVM hypervisor with Linux 
version 3.8.0. DADE requires a source code of OS 
kernel.  
The issues of preventing commodity OS kernel 
from vulnerable loadable kernel modules are 
analyzed in the project LKMG (Loadable Kernel 
Module Guard) by Tian et al. (2018), which is 
related to the second subgroup and uses EPT 
technology. LKMG can reveal the following 
malware activities in the kernel: modification of 
code and data, calling unauthorized kernel 
functions and stealing kernel sensitive information. 
The authors propose to use a policy-centric system 
to isolate various loadable drivers from the rest of 
the kernel. These security policies are generated 
automatically from source codes. LKMG utilizes 
the general security policy for dynamic data access: 
a driver can only access its own allocated kernel 
mode regions. LKMG is based on the Xen 
hypervisor and protects only Linux OS.  
In comparison with Sentry, HACS, and DADE, 
LKMG provides integrity and confidentiality for 
allocated data as well as code integrity. However, 
all of these require a source code of OS kernel, 
which is impossible for Windows OS. 
Hypervisor-based system HUKO (Liu et al., 2011) 
protects the kernel integrity for commodity OS 
from untrusted extensions. It uses VT-x and EPT 
technologies and is able to track dynamic contents 
such as dynamic kernel data, stack and heap region, 
and loadable extensions. It is able to protect the 
integrity of both kernel code and data. HUKO 
prevents the OS data from being modified by 
kernel-mode drivers by isolating untrusted 
extensions from the OS kernel. HUKO considers 
three different categories of memory access 
subjects: OS kernel, trusted extensions, and 
untrusted extensions. HUKO does not restrict the 
OS kernel. Authors admit “it is possible that 
attackers can exploit the legitimate kernel interface 
to subvert the integrity of kernel,” for example, by 
exploiting bugs of the kernel API functions. In 
addition, HUKO does not protect privacy and 
integrity of the kernel-mode data of third-party 
drivers from being tampered. 
There are several research projects InkTag by 
Hofmann et al. (2013), AppGuard by Zha et al. 
(2015), which apply EPT technology to guarantee 
data security. However, they protect user-mode 
application contexts with code and data from the 
OS kernel and other apps and do not guarantee the 
security of kernel-mode memory.  
The following research prototypes ExOShim by 
Brookes et al. (2016), HyperForce by Gadaleta et 
al. (2012), and Sprobes by Ge et al. (2014) prevent 
memory disclosure attacks and provide kernel-
mode code integrity, without data protection. These 
projects only partially solve the goals of this paper. 
Authors proposed to apply the hypervisor-based 
system to reveal new DKOM attacks, which tamper 
with dynamic data structures. They considered the 
scenarios when malware subverts the OS scheduler 
and proposed an idea of detecting these anomalies 
by monitoring and checking the execution time of 
all processes. Their solution can only detect any 
unauthorized data modifications, without 
preventing or repairing them (Graziano et.el., 
2016).  
Security researcher A. Zabrocki proposed an 
advanced analog of PatchGuard for Linux-based 
OSes. Named Linux Kernel Runtime Guard 
(LKRG), it is a loadable kernel module that 
performs runtime integrity checking of the Linux 
kernel. LKRG supports from being loaded at early 
boot stage and “protects the system by comparing 
hashes which are calculated from the most 
important kernel region/ sections/structures with 
the internal database hashes”. A current version of 
LKMG provides code integrity and exploit 
detection. But, it does not protect allocated memory 
of third-party drivers (Zabrocki, 2018). 
The summary table with the comparative analysis 
of the major papers and projects is given in Table 1.  
In addition, the vast majority of analyzed methods 
require the driver’s source code to protect allocated 
data. The proposed AllMemPro system can protect 
the compiled code without its source code.  
The next section will present the proposed system, 
which is said to be free from all the drawbacks 
mentioned above.  
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Table 1 Summary table of memory protection projects  
Title, year 
OS Kernel Third-Party Kernel-Mode Drivers 
OS 
Integrity Integrity Confidentiality 
Allocated 
Data 
Code 
Allocated 
Data 
Code 
Allocated 
Data 
Code 
Device Guard and Patch Guard 
in Windows 10 1709, 2017 
+–A + – + – – Windows 
Sentry, 2009 + – + – – – Linux  
HUKO, 2011 + + +–B – – – 
Windows 
Linux 
HyperForce, 2012; Sprobes, 
2014; ExOShim, 2016 
– + – – – – Linux 
HACS, 2017 + – – – – – Linux  
DADE, 2017 + – + – – – Linux  
LKMG, 2018 + + +–B + +–B – Linux  
LKRG, 2018 + + – + – – Linux 
AllMemPro, 2018 + –C + –C + –C Windows 
                                                     
A Windows security features reveal only unlinking critical structures; but they do not prevent changing the 
content of these structures; 
B HUKO and LKMG systems do not restrict the OS kernel, and as a result, they only partially protect data, 
which have been allocated by third party drivers; 
C The current version of AllMemPro protects only allocated data in the kernel mode. The protection of code 
integrity and confidentiality will be implemented further. 
 
3. PROPOSED ALLOCATED MEMORY 
PROTECTION – ALLMEMPRO 
This section covers the details of the proposed 
hypervisor-based system to guarantee the 
confidentiality and integrity of dynamically 
allocated data. 
To start with, I will show how to apply a hypervisor 
and EPT technologies to prevent these three 
scenarios of attacks on kernel-mode memory. I am 
going to use memory access rules, which are 
actively adapted to the newly allocated/freed data. 
Afterward, I will present the architecture of 
AllMemPro, which realizes the proposed ideas and 
will give some details about how to prevent 
unauthorized access to the allocated memory and 
grant access to the legitimate kernel-mode module. 
Finally, I will show three cases of using the 
developed proof of concept prototype to protect 
allocated memory for both third-party driver and 
Windows kernel. 
3.1. Apply EPT to Guarantee Integrity and 
Confidentiality of Dynamically Allocated Data 
This section suggests using EPT technology to 
prevent typical malware attacks. 
As was stated above, the dynamically allocated data 
can contain sensitive information, such as crypto 
keys, users’ private data, parameters of CNC 
machines, process privileges and drivers 
information.  
Three Scenarios of Attacks. Attackers try to 
tamper all this data and it is possible to define three 
main scenarios, see Figure 1. First, attackers can 
steal/read and modify/write the allocated data of 
third-party drivers. Second, they are also able to 
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steal/read and patch/write the code sections of 
third-party drivers and Windows core drivers. 
Finally, they could unlink and modify the allocated 
structures in Windows internal lists.  
To deal with all these three scenarios, I propose to 
use separate memory access rules to protect 
dynamically allocated data from being stolen or 
modified illegally. These rules can also be applied 
to guarantee the integrity and confidentiality of 
kernel-mode modules, which are loaded in the 
memory. The key feature of the memory access 
rules is that they avoid illegal access to the 
protected memory without deliberately generating 
BSOD like Windows built-in security systems 
(Field, 2006). These rules also allow protecting 
newly allocated memory regions.  
To grant only legal access and prevent all others it 
is needed to intercept each memory access to the 
sensitive memory regions. The EPT technology 
provides an excellent opportunity to trap and 
process each read-, write-, and execute- access on 
the 4-kilobyte memory page. 
Scenario 1. Stealing and modifying the allocated 
data of third-party drivers. Let us consider the 
first case when malware tries to access the allocated 
memory for the third-party driver. 
To protect the dynamically allocated data I propose 
to use the memory access rules, according to which 
the hypervisor will grant or prevent particular 
access. The hypervisor controls only the memory 
regions, whose data is in the list of rules. 
This memory access rule includes the following 
five values: DriverStartAddr, DriverSize, 
AllocatedStartAddr, AllocatedSize, and 
SharedAccess. As a result, access attempt to the 
memory, which is located between 
AllocatedStartAddr and AllocatedStartAddr + 
AllocatedSize is granted only to the code from 
DriverStartAddr to DriverStartAddr + DriverSize. 
An example of such a rule is given in Table 2.  
The default shared access rule prevents read access 
(R=0) and write access (W=0) to the memory from 
other drivers and Windows kernel.  
If this allocated memory needs to be accessed by 
another kernel-mode module or Windows kernel I 
have to add a similar memory access rule. To 
automatically add a corresponding rule, I use a pre-
configured list of driver names, which share the 
memory with the protected driver, e.g. for sharing 
allocated memory with Windows Kernel I use 
ntosknl.exe. Provided I have only a binary code of 
the driver module, whose allocated memory is 
critical for stealing and modifying I can apply 
reverse-engineering analysis to get such a list of 
driver names. 
The list of memory access rules needs to be 
updated for each kernel-mode module, whose 
memory is protected. To achieve this, I trap the 
following events: 
 the protected driver is loaded and unloaded;  
 the protected module allocates and frees 
memory.  
To realize the aforementioned memory access 
rules, I leverage the hypervisor facilities and EPT 
technology using five steps.  
Step 1. Start: trap loading drivers. First, the 
hypervisor is loaded before the protected driver is 
loaded to the memory. The hypervisor will be 
notified whenever an image is loaded into the 
memory using PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine and 
choose, which kernel-mode driver will be protected 
using its name. Apart from module names, the 
hypervisor can also use the IMAGE_INFO 
structure content; all these parameters need to be 
pre-configured.  
Table 2 An example of memory access rules 
DriverStartAddr DriverSize AllocatedStartAddr AllocatedSize SharedAccess 
fffff8016f670000  
(mem_allocator_driver.sys) 
0000B000 FFFFA400AF3C3F80 40 R=0, W=0 
fffff80170201000  
(ntosknl.exe) 
008D2000 FFFFA400AF3C3F80 40 R=0, W=0 
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Step 2. Trap memory allocation (deallocation) 
and update EPT pages permissions. Second, the 
hypervisor traps each memory allocation 
(deallocation) routines. The hypervisor will choose 
only those routines from all that have been called 
from the code belonging to the protected driver. 
Without the loss of generality, this paper is 
essentially concerned with the use of 
ExAllocatePoolWithTag routine to allocate 
memory pool and ExFreePoolWithTag to free 
allocated memory. This function is used in all other 
memory allocation routines, for example, by 
ExAllocatePool*, FsRtlAllocatePool*. Also, it is 
considered that MiAllocatePoolPages routine, 
which is used by ExAllocatePoolWithTag, has not 
been called directly by a kernel-mode driver.  
The corresponding rules will be added/removed in 
real time each moment the protected driver calls the 
allocation/deallocation routine.  
By applying EPT technology and EPT paging 
structures the hypervisor can intercept, process, and 
control each access to the memory. The proposed 
algorithm of using EPT facilities is taken from the 
paper by Korkin & Tanda (2017).  
I create EPT paging structures with default page 
access bits to permit all access. Next using the 
memory access rules, I limit the access to the fixed 
data in the kernel mode memory.  
After adding a new memory access rule, the 
hypervisor updates the EPT paging structures: it 
clears read- and write- permissions on the pages 
with the protected data and it clears read- and write 
permissions on the pages with the protected 
module. After the driver has freed memory, the 
hypervisor double fills this memory block with 
zeroes and removes the corresponding memory 
access rule. Removing the rule will cause restoring 
the corresponding EPT memory access 
permissions.  
As a result, each read- and write- access to the 
protected memory will cause an EPT violation.  
The hypervisor checks firstly whether an 
intercepted access belongs to the protected 
memory. Next, it checks which module has 
accessed the protected memory, according to the 
list of memory access rules.  
Step 3. Grant a legitimate access. The hypervisor 
grants access to the memory region only for the 
protected module, which has allocated this memory 
before, see Table 2. To achieve it the hypervisor 
temporarily sets read- or write- permission of the 
protected page and sets a Monitor Trap Flag 
(MTF). Setting MTF enables the system to generate 
VM Exit after executing each instruction.  
After the legitimate code accesses the memory, the 
control goes to the hypervisor again because of VM 
Exit. At this step, the hypervisor restores page 
permission by clearing access bits and clears MTF. 
Step 4. Prevent an unauthorized access. If a 
module not mentioned in the list of rules tries to 
access the protected memory, the hypervisor needs 
to prevent it. To achieve it, the hypervisor changes 
the page frame number (PFN) to the corresponding 
Page Table Entry (PTE) for the protected memory 
and temporarily grants access to the replaced 
memory by setting a read- or write- permission. 
The hypervisor also sets an MTF.  
After an unauthorized module reads or writes to the 
replaced page and executes just one instruction, the 
control goes to the hypervisor, because of VM Exit. 
Next, the hypervisor restores initial configuration: 
by setting an original PFN value for the protected 
memory, clearing access bits, and clearing MTF.  
Step 5. Finish: trap unloading the protected 
driver. After the protected driver has been 
unloaded the hypervisor zeroes out the memory, 
where this driver had been loaded. 
To be notified whenever an image is unloaded the 
hypervisor overwrites the function address of the 
DriverUnload from the DRIVER_OBJECT 
(MSDN, n.d.-a; OSR, 2017).  
These five steps provide the integrity and 
confidentiality for the dynamically allocated data in 
Windows kernel, see Figure 2.  
The proposed approach can be used for three 
malware scenarios, mentioned above.   
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Figure 2 The proposed method of preventing allocated memory from being illegally read or overwritten 
 
Scenario 2. Stealing and patching code sections. 
One of the new protection mechanisms, which has 
been integrated into Windows Device Guard in 
Windows 10 is Kernel Mode Code Integrity 
(KMCI) component. This component prevents 
modification of executable code directly and does 
not stop code reading. As a result, the code 
confidentiality is still becoming vulnerable. 
The preliminary testing of AllMemPro shows that 
the proposed approach of dynamically data 
protection cannot be used for code protection 
because it causes a serious overhead. One of the 
possible ideas for code protection is to apply two 
EPT structures: first EPT structure allows execution 
of the protected driver and blocks execution from 
all other memory; second EPT structure blocks 
access to the protected data and allows execution 
from all memory apart from the protected driver. 
The code protection will be implemented in further 
versions of AllMemPro. 
Scenario 3. Tampering Windows Data. To 
prevent unlinking and modifying the allocated 
structures in Windows internal lists I add a memory 
access rule for each structure (Sherer, 2017). 
For example, to avoid hiding EPROCESS 
structures by DKOM patching with the help of 
structures unlinking and overwriting its content 
(Korkin & Nesterow, 2016), the hypervisor adds 
memory access rules for the existing structures. The 
hypervisor updates the list of rules by trapping 
newly allocated structures using 
PsSetCreateProcessNotifyRoutine routine (MSDN, 
n.d.-c). In this case, the AllocatedDataAddress and 
AllocatedDataSize are the address and the size of 
an EPROCESS structure; the ModuleStartAddress 
and ModuleSize correspond to the ntosknl.exe.  
This section has covered a way of maintaining the 
integrity and confidentiality of dynamically 
allocated data by using memory access rules and 
leveraging the hardware-based hypervisor and EPT 
technology. 
The next section covers the architecture of the 
developed prototype, which realizes memory access 
rules.  
3.2. Architecture of AllMemPro  
This section covers the design and architecture of 
the developed hardware-based hypervisor 
AllMemPro, which protects the dynamically 
allocated memory in Windows kernel.  
The proposed system includes three main 
components the Controller, Switcher, and 
Dispatcher.  
The Controller traps loading drivers and allocation 
of data. To trap loading of each driver, the 
Controller uses PsSetLoadImageNotifyRoutine 
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routine, which registers a driver-supplied callback 
to notify whenever a new driver is loaded. A 
corresponding callback function gets three basic 
values, which are used to separate the protected 
drivers from others: full name to the loaded image 
file; an ImageBase and an ImageSize of the loaded 
driver in the memory (MSDN, n.d.-b).  
In the current version, the Controller chooses, 
which driver has to be protected using its name, but 
it is also possible to choose the protected driver 
using the calculated CRC from its file in the 
memory. The Controller intercepts memory 
allocation routine ExAllocatePoolWithTag and 
memory deallocation routine ExFreePoolWithTag 
using DdiMon developed by Tanda (2016). 
DdiMon monitors and controls kernel API calls 
with stealth hook using EPT technology.  
The Controller intercepts that the protected driver 
allocates memory and automatically sends the 
following memory access rule to the Switcher and 
to the Dispatcher, see Figure 3.  
The Switcher intercepts access to the protected 
memory data using the hypervisor and EPT 
facilities. The code of the Switcher is based on the 
MemoryMonRWX hypervisor (Korkin & Tanda, 
2017).  
In the beginning, the Switcher allocates EPT paging 
structure for all kernel-mode memory pages and 
sets default access right to skip all read-, write-, and 
execute- access. After receiving a memory access 
rule from the Controller, it changes memory access 
permissions to the pages, which include the 
protected data by clearing read- and write- bits. As 
a result, each memory access attempt to the 
protected data will cause EPT violation. 
The Switcher processes all EPT violation and 
chooses between two possible scenarios: grant and 
prevent access to the data by calling the Dispatcher.  
In the first case, the Switcher allows access to the 
protected data and sets Monitor Trap Flag (MTF), 
see EPT structure on step 4 on Figure 2. As a result, 
after executing just one instruction the Switcher 
traps control again and restores page permission by 
clearing read- and write- bits, and clears MTF. 
In the second case, as you can see EPT structure on 
step 4 Figure 2, the Switcher redirects access to the 
fake page by changing PFN value on the EPT page, 
which corresponds to the protected data. The 
Switcher also allows access to this data and sets 
MTF. As a result, after an unknown code accesses 
the fake data and executes just one instruction, the 
control goes to the Switcher again. Now the 
Switcher restores the original EPT configuration, 
see steps 1 & 2 in Figure 2.  
The Switcher decides which case is processed 
according to the Dispatcher module. 
The Dispatcher provides logic to grant and prevent 
access to the data according to the list of memory 
access rules. 
The Dispatcher grants full privileges to the owner 
of allocated memory. If an unregistered or 
unknown code accesses the protected data, the logic 
of processing will be the following:  
 if is_readable==0 a code cannot read the 
data, otherwise it can read them; 
 if 'is_overwritable==0' a code cannot write 
to this memory, otherwise it can write 
there; 
To allow another driver or Windows Kernel to read 
or to write to the protected data, the similar 
memory access rule needs to be added.  
In a nutshell, the Dispatcher uses the discretionary 
access control to prevent illegal access even to one 
byte of the protected data.  
AllMemPro system is developed using Microsoft 
Visual C++ 2015 with integrated Windows Driver 
Kit (WDK). It is tested using Vmware Workstation 
14 and Windows 10 1709 Build 16299.15 64-bit 
and multi-core CPU. The source code of 
AllMemPro is here Korkin (2018).  
I can conclude that the proposed hypervisor-based 
system has the following three advantages: 
 it can protect newly allocated memory 
using the Controller component; 
 it can prevent read- and write- access even 
to one byte of the protected data; 
 it works even without the source code of 
the protected driver. 
Next section will cover the three scenarios to 
demonstrate the facilities of AllMemPro. 
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typedef struct _MEMORY_ACCESS_RULE { 
 void*   drvAddr; 
 unsigned __int64 drvSize; 
 void*   allocAddr; 
 unsigned __int64 allocSize; 
 int   is_readable; 
 int   is_overwritable; 
}MEMORY_ACCESS_RULE, *PMEMORY_ACCESS_RULE; 
Figure 3 A structure to store a memory access rule  
 
3.3. Demos of AllMemPro 
This section covers the demonstrations of applying 
AllMemPro hypervisor to protect kernel-mode 
memory. I show how AllMemPro isolates the 
dynamically allocated memory of third-party driver 
by read- and write- access from another one.  
Firstly, I load the kernel-mode driver 
(mem_allocator_driver.sys), which allocates 
memory fragment and reads this memory in the 
loop as well as updates the content of this memory 
after receiving the IOCTL-code from the console 
control app (mem_allocator_console.exe).  
Next, I load the second kernel-mode driver 
(mem_attacker_driver.sys), which plays the role of 
a spyware driver. This driver reads and writes to the 
content of memory, which was allocated by the first 
driver. Let me assume that a spyware driver can 
find the allocated data from 
mem_allocator_driver.sys without any issues. I 
control the second driver using another console 
program. 
Figure 4 shows the main scheme. The addresses 
and sizes of loaded drivers and allocated data are in 
Table 3.  
This unauthorized access demonstrates the fact that 
the allocated memory is not isolated from 
unauthorized access from others. 
The source code of mem_allocator_driver.sys and 
mem_attacker_driver.sys with control console apps 
is here Korkin (2018). 
 
Figure 4 Illegal driver reads and writes the memory allocated by the another driver 
Table 3 The details of objects in memory for the Figure 4 
Object in memory Start address Size 
mem_allocator_driver.sys FFFFF8016F630000 0xb000 
Allocated data by mem_allocator_driver.sys FFFFA400AC479FD0 0x10 
mem_attacker_driver.sys.sys FFFFF8016F650000 0x9000 
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Secondly, I load a hypervisor AllMemPro, see 
Figure 5 and Table 4 and the following memory 
access rule is added automatically, see Table 5. 
After that, I restore the allocated data content using 
control app for the first driver and try to read and 
write this data using the second driver. I can see 
that all access attempts from the second driver fail: 
after reading I get a zero value and writing access 
does not change the content. The corresponding 
debug output fragments of AllMemPro are in 
Figure 6.  
I can conclude that AllMemPro provides integrity 
and confidentiality for the dynamically allocated 
memory. 
 
Figure 5 AllMemPro grants access to the allocated memory only to the first 
kernel-mode driver according to the memory access rule 
Table 4 The details of objects in memory for the Figure 5 
Object in memory Start address Size 
mem_allocator_driver.sys FFFFF8016F630000 0xb000 
Allocated data by mem_allocator_driver.sys FFFFA400AC479FD0 0x10 
mem_attacker_driver.sys FFFFF8016F650000 0x9000 
nt (ntkrnlmp.exe)    FFFFF80170201000 0x8D2000 
Table 5 The memory access rule allows the mem_allocator_driver.sys access to the allocated data 
rule FFFFF8016F630000 B000 FFFFA400AC479FD0 10   
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Debug Output Fragment for legal read- access: 
22:34:47.513 INF #0     4  7732 System           
S= FFFFF8016F6317C8 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479FD8 (0000000000000000), T= R 
 
 
Debug Output Fragment for legal write- access: 
22:34:50.357 INF #0  8020  8144 mem_allocator_   
S= FFFFF8016F6314EA (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479FD8 (0000000000000000), T= W,  
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 01 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00  => 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ba 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00 
 
Debug Output Fragment for illegal read-access: 
illegal access FFFFF8016F651228 =>> FFFFA400AC479FD8  
 ** RweHandleMonitorTrapFlag FFFFF8016F651228 FFFFA400AC479FD8 ** 
 
22:35:05.952 INF #0    76  8060 mem_allocator_   
[Protected via ActiveMemPolice] Memory is being READ. Returning fake contents. 
22:35:05.952 INF #0    76  8060 mem_allocator_   
S= FFFFF8016F651228 (FFFFF8016F650000), D= FFFFA400AC479FD8 (0000000000000000), T= R 
 
Debug Output Fragment: for illegal write-access: 
illegal access FFFFF8016F651257 =>> FFFFA400AC479FD8  
 ** RweHandleMonitorTrapFlag FFFFF8016F651257 FFFFA400AC479FD8 ** 
 
22:35:20.405 INF #0    76  8060 mem_allocator_   
S= FFFFF8016F651257 (FFFFF8016F650000), D= FFFFA400AC479FD8 (0000000000000000), T= W,  
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ba 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00  => 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ba 0a 00 00 00 00 00 00  
 
22:35:20.405 INF #0    76  8060 mem_allocator_   
[Protected via ActiveMemPolice] Memory is being WRITTEN. Returning fake contents. 
Figure 6 The fragments of debug output for the Figure 5 
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Finally, I consider a general case, with shared 
memory. Now the first driver uses the allocated 
data to retrieve the system information using 
Windows Kernel routines, see Figure 7 and 
Table 6. To share the allocated data between the 
first driver and Windows Kernel I use the 
following two memory access rules, see Table 7. 
The first line makes the allocated buffer available 
to the first driver, and the second line – for the 
Windows kernel, (ntoskrnl.exe). Windows 
routine has successfully written internal data to 
this memory. The AllMemPro isolates this data 
from the second driver. All illegal memory 
attempts fail, see Figure 8.  
 
Figure 7 AllMemPro grants access to the allocated memory to the mem_allocator_driver.sys and Windows 
Kernel. AllMemPro prevents access to the mem_attacker_driver.sys, which is not in the list of rules 
Table 6 The details of objects in memory for the Figure 7  
Object in memory Start address Size 
mem_allocator_driver.sys FFFFF8016F630000 0xb000 
Shared Allocated data  FFFFA400AC479F80 0x40 
mem_attacker_driver.sys FFFFF8016F650000 0x9000 
nt (ntkrnlmp.exe)    FFFFF80170201000 0x8D2000 
Table 7 The rules allow mem_allocator_driver.sys and ntkrnlmp.exe to access to the allocated memory 
// for mem_allocator_driver.sys 
rule FFFFF8016F630000 B000 FFFFA400AC479F80 40   
 
// for ntkrnlmp.exe 
rule FFFFF80170201000 8D2000 FFFFA400AC479F80 40  
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Debug Output Fragment for illegal write- access  
** RweHandleMonitorTrapFlag FFFFF8016F651228 FFFFA400AC479F80 ** 
 
22:58:18.560 INF #0    76  8060 mem_allocator_   
[Protected via ActiveMemPolice] Memory is being READ. Returning fake contents. 
 
22:58:18.560 INF #0    76  8060 mem_allocator_   
S= FFFFF8016F651228 (FFFFF8016F650000), D= FFFFA400AC479F80 (0000000000000000), T= R 
 
Debug Output Fragment for legal write-access (mem_allocator_driver.sys, memset function 
fragment): 
22:51:03.306 INF #0     4  7732 System           
S= FFFFF8016F631743 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8B (0000000000000000), T= W,  
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 7d ff 0f 00  => 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 7d ff 0f 00  
 
22:51:03.306 INF #0     4  7732 System           
S= FFFFF8016F631743 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8C (0000000000000000), T= W,  
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 7d ff 0f 00  => 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff 0f 00  
 
22:51:03.306 INF #0     4  7732 System           
S= FFFFF8016F631743 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8D (0000000000000000), T= W,  
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 ff 0f 00  => 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0f 00  
 
22:51:03.306 INF #0     4  7732 System           
S= FFFFF8016F631743 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8E (0000000000000000), T= W,  
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 0f 00  => 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
 
22:51:03.306 INF #0     4  7732 System           
S= FFFFF8016F631743 (FFFFF8016F630000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8F (0000000000000000), T= W,  
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  => 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 
 
Debug Output Fragment for legal write-access (ntkrnlmp.exe, ZwQuerySystemInformation): 
22:51:03.306 INF #0     4  7732 System           
S= FFFFF801702FB65B (FFFFF80170201000), D= FFFFA400AC479F84 (0000000000000000), T= W,  
00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  => 00 00 00 00 5a 62 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  
 
22:51:03.306 INF #0     4  7732 System           
S= FFFFF801702FB65F (FFFFF80170201000), D= FFFFA400AC479F88 (0000000000000000), T= W,  
00 00 00 00 5a 62 02 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00 00  => 00 00 00 00 5a 62 02 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00  
 
22:51:03.306 INF #0     4  7732 System           
S= FFFFF801702FB737 (FFFFF80170201000), D= FFFFA400AC479F8C (0000000000000000), T= W,  
00 00 00 00 5a 62 02 00 00 10 00 00 00 00 00 00  => 00 00 00 00 5a 62 02 00 00 10 00 00 7d ff 0f 00  
Figure 8 The fragments of debug output for the Figure 7 
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In a similar way, I have successfully checked 
AllMemPro possibility of preventing illegal 
privileges escalation by directly modifying the 
content of EPROCESS structure.  
As a result, AllMemPro prevents stealing and 
modifying data, stores in the allocated memory 
pools in the kernel-mode and moderate 
performance overhead.  
4. ALLMEMPRO: POINTS FOR 
DEVELOPMENT 
This chapter focuses on critical analysis of 
AllMemPro downsides and possible ways of its 
improvement. 
AllMemPro Overhead. AllMemPro causes 
overhead during access to the protected memory 
regions, and this occurs because of several reasons, 
which can be partially eliminated.  
The evaluation of overhead was performed by 
measuring the duration of 10 access attempts to the 
allocated memory in three cases: without 
hypervisor with enabled memory cache; without 
hypervisor and disabled cache; and finally, with 
AllMemPro hypervisor and time cheating.  
All these measures are processed on VMware 
Workstation Pro in the release version of all 
drivers. To get enough measurements, I use 200 
repetitions, next I delete five maximums values and 
five minimums ones and finally calculate the 
average and deviation values, see Table 8. 
In the first case, the latency is quite small because 
after first several memory access attempts the 
corresponding virtual and physical addresses are 
cached and further access was processed using 
these cache values. To make the comparison with 
hypervisor case a bit more appropriate I applied the 
second case with the deliberately disabled cache.  
In the third case, I measured the latency of memory 
access to the protected memory from the legal 
driver, when AllMemPro has been activated.  
AllMemPro hypervisor traps each access to the 
protected memory region because this memory 
does not have read- and write- permissions. After 
that, the hypervisor sets the corresponding 
permissions and according to the memory access 
rule allows or disallows memory access to this data 
by changing PFN-value. At this step, AllMemPro 
sets MTF and returns control to the guest. After the 
guest executes just one instruction, the control goes 
to the hypervisor again because of MTF. 
Next AllMemPro clears MTF and restores original 
permissions to the memory to be able to trap a new 
access to the protected region. 
As a result, for each memory access attempt, 
AllMemPro has been called two times, which leads 
to time overhead. It is possible to reduce it by 
applying two EPT structures. The first EPT 
structure corresponds to the legal driver and its 
memory and the second EPT – to the other memory 
ranges. However, in this case, to isolate the 
allocated memory of two and more drivers from 
each other and from the other drivers it is needed to 
allocate the separate EPT structures for each driver. 
This approach has been implemented in the 
MemoryMonRWX hypervisor by Korkin and 
Tanda (2017).  
As a result, AllMemPro protects memory, which 
has a low frequency of access, for example, the 
EPROCESS.Token value. AllMemPro does not 
decrease memory access time for non-protected 
memory regions. To protect memory, which is very 
often accessible it is possible to apply multiple EPT 
structures. 
 
Table 8 Time evaluation 
No. Cases Memory Access Latency, TSC ticks 
1 without AllMemPro with enabled cache 70±2 
2 without AllMemPro with disabled cache 100.000±4.000 
3 with AllMemPro hypervisor 500.000±10.000 
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Indirect Memory Access. AllMemPro determines 
the source address by reading the value of RIP 
register from VMCS-structure. To prevent indirect 
memory access AllMemPro can additionally check 
the call stack, but in the current version, this is not 
implemented.  
Self-protection: Resilience to Manipulations. 
Malware driver can access the protected data by 
deliberately changing the memory access rules 
content. It is possible to protect these rules by 
applying the proposed AllMemPro hypervisor to 
protect itself.  
Protect Memory with Shared Access. The current 
AllMemPro protects shared memory in the 
following way. For two drivers, using shared 
memory, all memory regions, which are allocated 
to each of these drivers, are available to read- and 
write- access by either driver and are isolated from 
any other access. It is possible to provide fine-
grained access control to shared memory.  
To allow shared access only to the 
programmer-specified buffers, it is necessary to 
integrate AllMemPro at a source level during driver 
development. 
Pagefile Mechanism. It is possible to overwrite the 
third-party driver allocated memory by forcing the 
kernel to page-out the kernel memory pool and then 
locating and overwriting the driver memory inside 
the pagefile in the hard disk. This can be used not 
only to attack the memory pool but also to 
overwrite the third-party driver code sections. The 
current version of AllMemPro does not protect the 
pagefile mechanism.  
Firmware exploitation as a vector of infection. 
This research does not consider firmware 
exploitation as one of the possible ways of 
infections. Because of this infection, the malware 
code is able to tamper both OS and hypervisor 
memory, as well as injecting code into OS kernel. 
Hypervisor-based solutions cannot prevent such 
infections. 
Direct Access to the Physical Memory. 
AllMemPro can potentially prevent direct access to 
the physical memory or access to the mapped 
memory pages by MmMapLockedPages(). The 
current version of AllMemPro deliberately converts 
the virtual address to the physical one. At the same 
time, DMA attacks using firmware exploitation and 
hardware are out of the scope of this paper.  
Confidentiality and Integrity of Code Sections. 
The current version of AllMemPro protects only 
allocated data in the kernel mode. The protection of 
code sections from being illegally read and 
overwritten will be implemented further.  
Joint work with Win10 Windows 10: Device 
Guard and Credential Guard. AllMemPro has 
been successfully tested on default installation 
Windows 10 x64 1709 version, which is installed 
as a BIOS-version. The tested on UEFI versions of 
Windows OS will be processed further. 
SGX technology and Virtual Secure Mode. The 
Software Guard Extensions (SGX) technology 
makes it possible to protect the areas of execution 
in memory via enclaves. This technology has been 
integrated into 6th generation Intel CPUs, while 
AllMemPro supports Intel CPUs since Nehalem 
microarchitecture, which is more common now. 
In addition, a similar idea was implemented to 
secure kernel for Windows 10 by leveraging 
Virtual Secure Mode with Virtual Trust Levels 
(VTLs). According to A. Ionescu, it is possible to 
apply VTL to protect some kernel-mode data 
(Juarez, 2015; Ionescu, 2015; Laiho, 2016).  
5. CONCLUSIONS & FUTURE WORK 
To sum up, the proposed security system 
AllMemPro has the following competitive 
advantages:  
 it provides fine-grained control to mediate 
access from kernel-mode drivers to the 
dynamically allocated memory; 
 it protects allocated memory of third-party 
drivers and the content of OS structures;  
 it guarantees the integrity and 
confidentiality of the allocated data by 
redirecting unauthorized access without 
crushing OS; 
 it is an open-source project with minimal 
lines of code, which can be used for 
educational purposes to teach VT-x & EPT. 
Spectre & Meltdown Attacks. AllMemPro 
hypervisor seems to be able to prevent sensitive 
kernel-mode data from being stolen using the 
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newest Spectre and Meltdown attacks (Horn, 2018). 
However, further research is required.  
With regard to the future, I would like to suggest 
the following ideas of using AllMemPro to prevent: 
o leakage of the Windows Telemetry 
memory data;  
o drivers’ exploitation by validating 
kernel-mode code execution; 
o unauthorized access from kernel-mode 
malware to files, registry, and processes.  
Windows Telemetry leakage. Windows Telemetry 
includes a lot of sensitive user information and has 
to be protected from unauthorized access by 
malware. Another issue is to disable the Windows 
Telemetry data reliably. As a result, users will be 
confident that the private data: Browsing History, 
Voice Input, GPS data, etc. will not be collected 
and transferred to anyone.  
Preventing Drivers’ Exploitation. To reveal the 
fact that the driver is being exploited I propose the 
following. AllMemPro will trap and log the driver 
code execution using a lot of valid input data. 
Secondly, I will analyze the progress of code 
execution and create some signatures, using the 
corresponding control flow graph (CFG). Finally, I 
will test this code using common data or data with 
exploits. By comparing the code execution with 
signature CFG I will check whether the code 
executes all its parts or it skips something from 
CFG. If it skips any part, it means that the driver’s 
behavior is not normal and someone is using its 
vulnerability. 
Preventing Kernel-Mode Malware from 
Accessing Files and Registry. Windows security 
model provides the registry key and file security 
only for user-mode applications. It means that 
kernel-mode drivers do not have any limitations to 
access filesystem and registry. As a result malware 
driver can read, write, and even delete files and 
registry data, which are processed by user-mode 
applications or other drivers. My idea is to adapt 
the AllMemPro to prevent this unauthorized access 
by monitoring and controlling access attempts to 
filesystem and registry. The proposed system will 
use the similar access rules to grant access only to 
the owner and registered drivers and will stop 
access from the illegal ones.  
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